The last decades Central Africa, and especially the Great Lakes Region that comprises RDCongo, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, has become extremely militarized. Since August 1998 a war has been going on which confronts an alliance of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi to the RDCongo, supported by Zimbabwe and Angola. In the shadow of this confrontation local wars are fought out at smaller scale, but not less bloody. In the process of militarization the USA have played a central roll, with secondary rolls for some European countries, especially France. More recently several other players have come up as arms providers, such as South Africa and Eastern-European countries as Russia and Ukraine. Making use of several studies by researchers and investigative journalists I want to explain how the US policy has created the foundations of the actual horrible situation in the region, which keeps millions of people in a state of starvation and extreme insecurity.
During WO2 the Belgian Congo was of high military and strategic interest for the US and its allied forces because of its mines of copper and uranium, essential for the warfare. Indeed the first atomic bombs were constructed from the uranium, mined in Congo's Katanga province. When in 1960 Congo became an independent state the US-president Eisenhower was afraid that Congo's resources would fall into the hands of his Cold War adversaries. Since the new prime minister Patrice Lumumba was considered unreliable, he was murdered and replaced by Joseph Desire Mobutu who was willing to follow the orders from Washington. In the 30 years that followed (until the end of the Cold War) Mobutu created an impressive army, which received from the USA all kind of weapons, worth about $300 million, together with training facilities for another $100 million. Although the Zairian army (FAZ) never impressed by its fighting qualities, it was effective to prevent opposition against the dictator and his ruling elite. When in 1996 the regime of Mobutu imploded, the FAZ-soldiers hardly defended the regime and left most of their weapons to the invading AFDL-troops of Laurent Kabila, as well as to Rwandan Hutu and Congolese civilians, especially light weapons which are easy to carry and to make money with.
In Uganda, a former British colony, Museveni came to power in 1986, after a bloody period under Milton Obote and Idi Amin. During the civil war Museveni's army consisted for an important part of Rwandan Tutsi who were very good soldiers. They were recruited from refugees living in Uganda since the independence of Rwanda (in 1959), where the Hutu majority had taken the power. The Clinton administration, at first unhappy with Museveni because he did not want to install multi-party democracy, welcomed the new leader in the framework of a new US-policy in Africa, which was enthusiastically promoted by his Secretary of State, mrs Albright. It claimed that a new leadership ("beacons of hope") in Africa was rising, which would diffuse freedom and democracy in Africa with US military support. In 1995 Uganda was among the first to profit from US-financed military training programs, indicated by acronyms as JCET, ACRI and IMET, apart of arms deliveries of about $500.000 annually.
After helping to bring Museveni to power, general Paul Kagame and his Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1990 started to fight their way back into their own country with the intention to topple the regime of the Rwandan Hutu government of Habyarimana. When in 1994 by UN-mediation a power sharing agreement seemed near, the airplane of Habyarimana was shot down when landing on Kigali airport. This triggered the mass killings on Rwandan civilians, in majority Tutsi's, commonly known as the Rwandan genocide. Although supporters of the regime were generally accused of this act, more and more evidence is coming up that Kagame and his RPF were behind the attack. Indeed, the plane was downed by a SAM-16 missile, delivered by the Americans to Museveni, Kagame's close friend and supporter, from stocks of the Gulf War, Furthermore, in the months before the attack some RPF-members had been in the USA for military training that included the use of surface-to-air missiles!
Immediately after coming to power, Kagame was welcomed by de US-administration as one of the new leaders of Africa. The military help given by US to the Tutsi government in the years to come include arms, training and the construction of a complete military base at Cyangugu at the border with Zaire. When, in 1996, the Rwandan troops crossed the Zairian border to dislodge the Hutu in the refugee camps, they got intense support of US specialists for intelligence and logistics. This military operation, that caused the death of an estimated 200.000 Rwandan Hutu, brought Laurent Desire Kabila to power in Kinshasa, where he stood under close political and military supervision of Rwanda, and so indirectly of the USA.
In august 1998 this situation had become unbearable for Kabila and his crew as well as for most of the population in Kinshasa. The Rwandan soldiers, together with Congolese Tutsi, which occupied high positions in the Congolese government, left the country; but not for long. Few days later already a combined army of Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian soldiers invaded the country, from the East as well as from the West. The air and ground operations in West-Congo - more than 2000 km from the Rwandan territory! - were logistically supported by a US-warship before the Congolese coast. The operation at the west front was finally aborted by unforeseen intervention from Angola and Zimbabwe, called in by Laurent Kabila. Especially the help of Mugabe's army has been essential to protect the Congolese capital against the invading army; this act of insubordination to the superpower was unforgivable, and is a main reason for the continuing Anglo-Saxon determination to crush Mugabe.
Since 1998 more than one half of RDCongo is occupied by troops of Rwanda and Uganda. Both countries have armies that are large compared to their dimensions and that form a heavy burden for their social and economic development, which is illustrated by budget-figures given by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. If this is already true for Uganda that spends more than 2% of its GDP for an army of about 60.000 troops, it is flagrant for Rwanda, although the regime does its best to camouflage it. Indeed, this small and poor country with approximately 7 million inhabitants has an army of at least 70,000, bigger than that of Uganda, a country with 3 times as many inhabitants and 4 times as rich. It is clear that Rwanda can only survive with enormous inputs of foreign aid and of revenues that are not accounted for in the ordinary state budget. Curiously, the figures, that IISS gives of the Rwandan Defence Expenditures, $135 million, differ much from those given by other sources: For exemple, the SIPRI report 2001 gives a figure of $88.6 million. Probably the lower figure is presented to IMF, and other international donors, but the higher will be nearer to reality. This fact throws some light on the way the government in Rwanda is organized: an official government with ministers and a budget but without real power, next to a military network controlling the whole society, with at its top general Paul Kagame who takes all important decisions. This network that is of course also responsible for the occupation of the eastern part of Congo. A rough calculation of the costs of the Rwandan occupation force of about 25.000 soldiers in RDCongo shows that its maintenance requires at least $51.6 million; this accounts nicely for the difference between the figures of SIPRI and IISS! But the additional amount seems to be no problem: (As Nelly will show) the occupation of Congo pays itself!
The war in Congo has hardly been fought between the aggressors and the Congolese army (FAC). Most of the work on the RDCongo side has been done by the Zimbabwean and Angolan armies. Since the Lusaka agreement (1999) these armed confrontations have stopped, but a hidden war continues, or better several wars continue. In the Kivu provinces the Rwandan army and its allies are confronted by armed groups of nationalist fighters, called Mayi-Mayi. Although they are relatively small in number and armament their attacks are frequently efficient; the Rwandan army usually reacts by massive retaliation against the civilian population, suspected of supporting the Mayi-Mayi. The Mayi-Mayi mostly use small arms which are abundant in the region, as do other groups and militia which try to survive in the devastated region. A UN-conference on Small Arms, held in 2001, estimated the total number of these weapons in the world on 500 million. Given the intensity and duration of the conflicts in the region, millions of small arms and light weapons must be circulating in the eastern part of Congo.
In spite of the enormous death toll of the conflict, the international community has never laid an arms embargo on the countries of the region, but for RDCongo, the aggressed country! So Rwanda and Uganda can legally import arms from dealers all over the world. Especially South Africa has become a big arms supplier (with companies as Armscor, Miltech, Kunune Brothers, etc.); Rwanda is one of S.A.'s best clients. Many other South-African companies do military advising and training. Since the USA stopped to train Rwandan soldiers because of the bad human rights reputation of the country, a South African firm Alpha-5 is doing this job. But also non-state actors can easily acquire light weapons. Worldwide the illegal trade in small arms is worth $1 billion (compared to $4 billion legal trade). Payment can be made in diamonds or gold, dug up in the Congolese soil. Importing arms via Tanzania is known to be no problem. About 25% of the countries in the world supply weapons to users in Central Africa, legally or illegally. Most light weapons in Congo come from China, Belgium, Russia, USA and Israel. As one US-government official wisely put it: 'Many weapons purchased legally for security needs in one conflict, turn up being used for illicit purposes in another'. Even if nowadays the USA are no longer among the larger arms providers, "the arms networks created by the U.S. - the middlemen, the landing strips, the cargo companies - are now employed by private dealers to ship arms throughout Central Africa." These networks have always been used for overt activities, i.e. for programs controlled by the US Congress, as well as for covert actions, paid from secret budgets and frequently executed by Private Military Contractors (PMC). As one source says: "Many of the illicit arms traffickers working in Central Africa got their start as covert operators for the U.S. " US policy has laid the base for the actual armed anarchy in the Great lakes Region. Many smaller countries and companies are interested to continue this situation for their own benefit. A worldwide mobilisation is necessary to help the people of Congo to get rid of this murderous heritage of neo-colonialism and militarism.
Nico Dekker
JCET (Joint Combined Exchange Training): JCET is a program whereby US special forces participate with foreign militaries in combat and other military training operations in the host country's territory. JCET is officilally designed to improve the capacity of US special forces. Btu foreign militaries are participating in joint operations with the US military involving combat exercises.
ACRI (African Crisis Response Initiative):ACRI is a supposed to be a program engaged in promoting stability and improving the capabilities of selected African militaries to connduct effective Peacekeeping and Humanitaria Assistance operations. [It has been criticized as "serving mainly to bolster their fighting qualities through combat execises". And that "there is little hope that the ACRI will produce soldiers with deep concern for human rights and respect for civil authority"]
IMET (International Military Education Training): a study program for milutary officers from around the world at American institutions. Objectives: "to encourage effective, mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between yhe US and foreign countries in the furtherance of the goals of international security and peace, etc".
II. IISS Military Balance 2000/2001
Uganda (1999)
Population 22.3 million
GDP $8.0 billion
per capita $1900
Defense budget $138 million [1.7% of GDP]
Defense expenditure $199 million [2.5% of GDP]
Army (Ugandan People's Defense Force): 50-60,000 [Abroad, in DRC: 15,000]
Rwanda (1999)
Population 7.2 million
GDP $2.2 billion
per capita $ 500
Defense budget $135 million [6.1% of GDP]
Defense expenditure $ 135 million [6.1% of GDP] (1)
Army (Rwandan Patriotic Army): 55-70,000 [Abroad, in RDC:15-20,000] (2)
(1) The SIPRI-yearbook 2000 gives: $88.6 million [4.0% of GDP]
(2) In 2002 this is about 30,000 in RDC]
III. Sources
[1] The European Union's aid policy towards countries involved in the Congo war: lever for peace or incitement to war? Réseau Européen Congo, May 2001.
[2] Brian Wood & Johan Peleman : The Arms Fixers, 1999. (www.nisat.org/publications/armsfixers/)
[3] Al Venter: Arms pouring into Africa. New African, January 1999.
[4] Dr Herbert L. Calhoun (US State Department): Small Arms and Light Weapons: Can They Be Controlled? 2000.
[5] Wayne Madsen: A Smoking Gun in Washington. Prepared Statement for briefing organised by U.S.-Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney on 16 April 2001. (www.house.gov/mckinney/news/pr010416.htm)
[6] William D.Hartung & Bridget Moix: Deadly Legacy: U.S. Arms to Africa and the Congo War. World Policy Institute, Arms Trade Resource Center, 2000. (www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/congo.htm)
[7] Dena Montague & Frida Berrigan: The Business of War in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Who Benefits? World Policy Institute, Arms Trade Resource Center, 2001.
[8] Central Africa: The Influx of Arms and the Continuation of Crisis. Public Education Center. (www.publicedcenter.org/nsns/africa/arms.html)
[9] Les Roberts e.a.: Mortality in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: Results from Eleven Mortality Surveys. International Rescue Committee (IRC), IRC Health Unit, 2001
[10] Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of the Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. UN Security Council, S/2001/357, 12 April 2001. (www.un.org/News/index.html).
[11] Addendum to [10], S/2001/1072, 13 November 2001.
[12] Interim report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of the Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. UN Security Council, S/2002/565, 22 May 2002.
[13] Supporting the War Economy in the DRC: European Companies and the Coltan Trade: Five Case Studies. International Peace Information Service (IPIS), January 2002.
[14] War Within the War: Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Eastern Congo. Human Rights Watch, June 2002. (www.hrw.org)