On the 16/03, during the visit of President Joseph Kabila to the European Community, Xavier Solana entrusted a similar task to the Special Envoy of the European Union to the Great Lakes region, Mr Aldo Ayello. On the 12/02/01, the latter declared in Brussels: "Disarmament of Hutu extremists fighting for the DRC would lead to 'uncover the real interests of the Rwandans' in DRC", and of the Ugandans (cf. the 'Report of the UN Group of Experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other wealth of DRC' sent by Koffi Annan to the Security Council of the 12/04/01).
The aim of this document is to try to circumscribe the problem more clearly, based on field information, so as to be able to propose realistic solutions. Since Rwanda is the main country to put forward its 'security problem' uncompromisingly, so as to refuse withdrawing its troops from DRC, this document will focus mainly on 'ex-FAR and Interahamwe'. Indeed, Uganda itself recently minimised the insecurity problem using DRC as a pretext, and indicated its will to withdraw its troops, while Burundian rebels are considered as valid negotiators within the framework of the (very fragile) peace process of Arusha. As to Angola, its presence in DRC is truly inspired by its fight against UNITA whether in Angola or on the Rwandan (and Ugandan?) side. Finally, let us emphasise that Rwanda's right to enjoying security on its borders should also be a right for all the other countries of the region, including DRC. Furthermore, Kigali requiring security refers to, firstly, the security of the actual 'regime' relying on the support of a strongly ethnic minority. The actual predominant policy of exclusion of the FPR towards Hutu majority, and towards part of the Tutsi, will lead every time and inevitably to resistance.
Through their numerous long-lasting contacts on the field, all over DRC and in the countries of the Great Lakes region, and in Kivu in particular, certain organisations, members of the REC, have at their disposal interesting and useful information in this regard. Because at the level of Human Rights the situation in Kivu is worrying, the sources on which this document is based remain generally anonymous.
1. Introduction: the problem of "security in Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi"
The problem of insecurity from Zaire-Congo has been real for these three countries, especially after 1994, with the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees in Kivu, including ex-FAR and Interahamwe. The weakness and poor governing of the Zairean State, as well as the use of Rwandan and Burundian refugees in Kivu by Mobutu, feeling the effects of the end of his reign, encouraged Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda to search for a military solution by destroying refugee camps and hunting refugees down across Congo in 1996-1997. After an intense occupation of a large part of Congo over a five-year period, after the fights between Rwandan and Ugandan troops in the middle of the city of Kisangani, and considering the importance of the illegal plundering of resources in East Congo, the security claims of these countries are today put increasingly into perspective on the international level. And for about one year now, incursions into Rwanda and Uganda from DRC have been rare. However, it is clear today that there is a security problem for Congolese populations in East Congo.
What exactly is the situation concerning ex-FAR and Interahamwe in DRC who supposedly represent a threat to Rwanda, and concerning other rebel groups in Uganda and Burundi? Indeed, recent repetitive events in Kivu lead one to believe that Rwanda is doing everything to artificially maintain this 'threat'. And if these groups constitute a real problem for these countries, in which direction can we go to solve this problem realistically, and finally force foreign troops out of DRC?
2. 'Negative forces' in Kivu: degree of 'threat' for neighbouring countries
If, incontestably, Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian rebels still exist in DRC, creating a potential threat to the security of these countries to a greater or lesser extent, these very countries not only lend support to Congolese rebels fighting against the Kinshasa Government, but their regular armies also occupy almost half of DRC territory.
In this regard, and contrarily to the image of 'civil war' certain international media have been spreading by constantly referring to it, as far as Congolese populations are concerned, the war is first of all the doing of Rwanda and Uganda who, in order to invade DRC and remain there, have created their Congolese rebels, while keeping up their own civil war against their own rebels in Congolese territory. Thus, in order to arrive at a sustainable peace in the region, not only will it be necessary to withdraw foreign troops from DRC and create inter-Congolese dialogue, but also to succeed in establishing a reconciliation process internal to these countries, in Rwanda and Burundi in particular.
Moreover, in the context of this war, it is extremely difficult to locate and obtain precise figures in respect of the different 'negative forces', information that would somehow enable the evaluation of the potential threat as regards the stability of neighbouring countries. As to the governments and the Rwandan, Burundian and Ugandan armies controlling that region of DRC, they must certainly be aware of the whereabouts of certain 'rebel' concentrations. But these countries are usually happy to just supply very general insinuations without providing either proof or details. Kigali is an exception in this case, when it recently submitted to the Mixed Military Commission (Lusaka Agreement) a detailed document on ex-FAR / Interahamwe, including the names of 34 high-commanders, names of places and accurate figures. It remains to see whether these are indeed correct.
Finally, DRC and Rwanda in particular, maintain a systematic confusion between 'negative forces' in Kivu, by attributing every armed attack in the region to the Interahamwe-Mayi Mayi-FDD. In so doing, Rwanda would obviously artificially increase the danger posed by these 'negative forces'. On a simple word from Rwanda or DRC, certain Western media also repeat this very confusion. Here is one of the many examples: "Fierce fighting is still taking place around Shabunda between DRC soldiers and militias mostly made up of Rwanda ex-FAR, Interahamwe and Mayi-Mayi fighters. Confrontations burst at the beginning of February 2000, resulting, according to OCHA, in the displacement of around 15 000 people moving towards Mwenga. According to South Kivu Vice-Governor Benjamin Serukiza, militias are equipped with heavy machine guns and anti-aircraft canons." (Irin 11/02/01) DRC-Goma announced that its forces were involved in violent fights with a group of some 5 000 Hutu in Shabunda. (ANB-BIA, from various sources, 15/02/01). Yet, various other local and reliable sources did not mention the presence of Interahamwe in Shabunda at the time, but did mention Mayi-Mayi fighting against DRC-APR troops. This was already the case in 2000, and it has been continuing until today.
2.1 Interahamwe and ex-FAR in Kivu under Rwandan control
2.1.1. Geographical location
Where former Kivu covered an extensive part of the territory and was well diversified in terms of its geography and populations, one must differentiate between its various parts when mentioning Interahamwe and ex-FAR. One must recall also that not all Rwandan Hutu refugees in Kivu are armed, and that those who are armed at present are not necessarily 'genocidal Interahamwe'. In addition, 7 years have passed since the genocide, and the youth of 15-16 years old who are all today considered as 'Interahamwe' by the APR, were not old enough to be Interahamwe in 1994. The objective of the first war (of 'liberation') was to destroy refugee camps in Zaire that included armed groups. Nearly one million of refugees then went back to Rwanda, including former soldiers and militia men, and dozens, if not hundreds, of thousands of Hutu died in the forests of Zaire, either killed by the APR or because of illness and hunger.
It is useful to recall that in 1990, Rwanda counted only 8 000 FAR or career militaries, no more than that. Among those able to take refuge in Zaire in 1994, many officers found the opportunity to emigrate outside of the camps. This was also the case for civil Hutu leaders. The militaries who were still there in 1996 and who managed to escape the massacres, tried to reach RCA or Congo-Brazzaville, a few Angola and some Kigoma in Tanzania.
Next to the FAR, the Habiyaramana regime recruited many young men in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994. These did not benefit from much schooling and were sent as cannon fodder to the front. A certain number of them became subsequently 'Interahamwe' and, in 1994, also left for the camps in Tanzania and Zaire especially. Those who survived and who did not come back to Rwanda, in 1996, fled towards the West or towards Kigoma in Tanzania, or managed to live in the forests and mountains of Kivu. President Kagame asserts that he succeeded in incorporating at least 3 000 of them in his army.
President Kagame himself assessed in front of the Security Council of the 07/02/01 the presumed number of ex-FAR and Interahamwe in DRC as amounting to 15 000, when he had always spoken of 40 000!
The number of former Interahamwe and ex-FAR (these are not automatically comparable to being genocidal) could not exceed, at the very most, a few thousands still present and militarily active in the huge territory of former Kivu (North and South and Maniema). They are very much disorganised and have had no new weapons and ammunitions for the past year or two. They have had no proper military leadership, are demoralised concerning the former objective of re-conquering power in Kigali, and are especially concerned with surviving and coming back for good to Rwanda. Two years ago, in the middle of 1999, our sources in Kivu, as well as the diplomatic circles in Kinshasa, reckoned that they numbered between 5 000 and 6 000 for the whole of Kivu.
In the meantime, many Hutu came back to Rwanda and this flow seems to have accelerated in the past weeks: "Each day, the Hutu (whom we call Interahamwe here) return home or go to Uganda. On their way back, we can observe a non-violent behaviour because they sometimes ask for food and say goodbye to people. They are returning in large numbers. On adding up the information, we could almost say that 20 000 people crossed the border in the past month. Among them, women and children. The Rwandan army is bringing back a few men in Rwanda and prevents the rest from entering. Thus, each day, confrontations between APR and Hutu in the regions of Masisi and Rutshuru are reported. Each day, tension is rising and we fear that humanitarian aid is affected because the German NGO Agro Action Allemande (AAA) decided to suspend its activities in Masisi, following military exactions of the APR. Certain international NGOs and the MONUC have been accused by DRC and its Rwandan ally of supplying Hutu with weapons and ammunitions, which is stupid" (Local source 02/06/01).
From May 2001 onwards, Rwandan authorities have indeed been reporting attacks by 'Interahamwe' in the prefecture of Ruhengeri in North Rwanda. Several observers think that it is a show made up by Rwandan services with the complicity of certain DRC-Goma organisers, to have us believe in a real threat to the security of Rwanda, from the Congolese territories of Masisi and Walikale. But, at the same time when the attacks were reported, new rows of APR soldiers came from Kivu, via Goma and Bukavu, declaring that they came to stop the Interahamwe. Several hundreds of Rwandan soldiers were deployed on all the avenues of the town of Goma and Bukavu and on all the roads going out of town towards Walungu, Kabare and towards Kalehe in South Kivu. They are still there, armed to the teeth, and are reporting an imminent attack on the Interahamwe. All the hills of Bukavu are besieged by platoons of APR soldiers. And yet, no Interahamwe have been seen around town and nothing indicates a potential attack justifying a deployment of this scale. Bizima Karaha of DRC has just announced that they no longer want to negotiate because "Kabila supplied Interahamwe with a lot of weapons and is sending them to Rwanda to bring war there". He said that APR-DRC are going to continue war because they will never accept war going to Rwanda; and that they will fight until the end. Two weeks ago, Bizima Karaha declared in Goma that he was going to begin a third war in case their objectives were not reached, and that Interahamwe were not exterminated. The potential fictitious attacks on Rwanda seem to have been organised with a view to support the recent declaration of President Kagame, following his meeting with emissaries of the UN Security Council, according to which "he did not intend leaving Congo at all as long as the last of the genocidal Interahamwe lived there". (Local source 31/05/01).
Furthermore, it is also possible that armed Hutu groups, coming from the "5 000 Hutu" having left the Congolese governmental side in North Katanga and North Kasaï, after the death of LD Kabila, so as to go to Kivu, have entered North Rwanda with their weapons. In the same way, it is also possible that this is another farce of Kigali faced with increasing international pressures to leave DRC.
Let us therefore see a few details concerning the presence of Rwandan Hutu armed groups, according to the regions and areas under Rwandan occupation.
In the forests of Maniema, the news received these last months are still not mentioning much about the presence of former refugees and, a fortiori, of Interahamwe and ex-FAR. However, since the death of LD Kabila, several ex-FAR and Interahamwe armed groups have entered Maniema in direction of Kivu, coming from the front in North Katanga, where they were with the governmental FAC.
On the other hand, in North-Kivu under Rwandan control, several groups of a few hundred Hutu - some armed and others not; the groups from North Kivu never having received news - continue to be reported near Walikale, Masisi (although a certain number of Tutsi families, having taken refuge in Rwanda for more than a year due to insecurity, have recently returned to Masisi that is from now on secure), Rutshuru and near the Virunga Park. But for more than a year, they were no longer successful in organising significant incursions in Rwanda. This was confirmed on several occasions by the Rwandan government itself. Security in Rwanda has become almost complete. A few attempts at the end of 2000 proved to be a failure, and the Rwandan government announced that it had neutralised the Interahamwe 'division' in Masisi (cf. ICG Africa Report n°27, 16/03/01, p.9).
What remains today, rather, are limited and disorganised groups of people unable to leave for one reason or another. Among them, former civil servants, traders and NGO organisers and what remains of their family, trying to do a little business and who are often at the mercy of local chiefs for whom they have to work in order to survive. Some leave for Uganda or Rwanda and others try to follow them.
Others behave like armed robbers whom the APR should be able to contain on the border, in case they wanted to cross it. Their number and their strike force seem to have diminished. In comparison with 1997-1999, there have been few cases of vehicle attack on the roads near Rutshuru in 2000.
Local sources consider that these armed Hutu groups - who sometimes, but rarely, work together with the Mayi-Mayi (MM) - have a capacity for being a nuisance vis-à-vis the local population, but cannot do much against an army like that of Rwanda. Thus, the APR keeps them out of reach of mineral quarries without difficulty - while letting certain groups of them digging and selling coltan. In addition, in North Kivu, collaboration is increasing between APR-DRC and certain Hutu - of whom former Interahamwe - to the detriment of the Congolese. Thus, the Commanding officer of the Nyabiondo battalion in Masisi is an Interahamwe. Many an Interahamwe and ex-FAR have been recruited in the Rwandan army, in Gisenyi and Kivu. Although armed robbers -referred to as Interahamwe by the DRC-APR - are sometimes arrested by the local police in Goma, they are immediately freed on order from DRC hierarchy.
Moreover, "more than 40 000 Rwandan refugees, scattered since 1996 in North Kivu, have come back to Rwanda since February 1999", (beginning of HCR activities in Goma) indicated an HCR official, "of whom close to 16 500 for the year 2000". "Two thousand came back to their native country since the beginning of 2001" (figures from beginning of March; since then, therefore, the flow has been accelerating). Making an estimate of the Rwandan refugees who are still present in this province is "very difficult", according to the HCR who is, however, planning to repatriate 20 000 new refugees for the year 2001. People want to leave the forest. They are leaving in small groups with HCR papers, not necessarily via border posts. Some leave via Uganda. The welcoming conditions in Rwanda being better, this has contributed to amplify the phenomenon of refugees who are going back home and who had been living in the equatorial forest for more than 4 years, explains a humanitarian source in Goma. For several months and, in particular, after a Summit on national reconciliation in Kigali, in October 2000, the government called for the return of all refugees in exile. (APA 14/02/01, used again in Recinfo 3.2001 of the 2/03/01).
More towards the North, West of the border of the Lubero territory, Hutu and Tutsi among whom some are Congolese (Magrivist) and others clearly Rwandan, recently arrived. They are burning down villages, plundering, raping and killing indigenous population. The escaping population is forced to leave the area and to live far from their environment: thousands of Congolese families have thus become war displaced persons and live in miserable conditions. During these events, DRC rebels remain silent. Their Congolese chief, Vita, is also working with certain groups of false "Mayi-Mayi" (bandits) for the FPR. The main objective is "the acquisition of lands" and the occupation of the place to benefit troops and foreign families (Rwandan but also Ugandan).
But there is also a group of about one thousand "true ex-FAR and Interahamwe", organised well enough. They deal with training, and even cultivate the fields and have good relations with the local population and the local officials. They have contacts with a few Mayi-Mayi.
In South Kivu, the situation is quite different from area to area.
Four European NGO went on a mission in Kivu in Mai-June 1999, and wrote in page 2 of their report, based on several accounts they heard:
"The Interahamwe are not a priority target for the Rwandan troops, nor are the Mayi-Mayi. On several occasions, the population informed Rwandan officers of the localised presence of Interahamwe but the DRC-APR troops did not fight against them. The Interahamwe are reputed for being very violent with the local population, regularly committing thefts, rapes, pillages and killings. If it does not look like the Interahamwe and ex-FAR are that numerous in South Kivu, they nevertheless have at their disposal weapons more sophisticated than the Mayi-Mayi who are themselves in greater numbers." (cf. Report of mission in South and North Kivu, 17th of May-2nd June 1999, p.14, 12/07/01).
For the whole of the Southern part of the province, testimonies are clear: towards the Highlands of Uvira and in areas of Uvira, Baraka, Fizi and beyond, there are neither Interahamwe nor any ex-FAR. Thus, Belgian journalist Raf Custers who sojourned in this area from 25/10/00 to 23/12/00 (and who came from Tanzania by crossing Lake Tanganyka, who fell into the hands of FDD Burundese rebels, and later joined the Mayi-Mayi), confirmed that he met no Hutu militias there, nor did he hear anyone speak about them during his long journey. Many local testimonies say the same thing.
However, there are still Hutu armed groups in the forests and mountains of the Northern and Western part of South Kivu, in the Biega-Kahuzi Park and surroundings, who were not able or did not dare returning to Rwanda. Thus, a mission of agents from the Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation and from the Surveying Directorate (accompanied by around forty soldiers as security) who went to the Park to "delineate it", was attacked on the 2/9/00. Ten persons were killed of whom one military commanding officer, 2 Surveyors, 2 farmers, 3 civil servants, the deputy chief of the commune of Nindja and the group chief. In fact, the soldiers accompanying them apparently went provoking armed men (ex-FAR or Interahamwe) and killed one of them. The next day, these ex-FAR/Interahamwe attacked the camping site of the agents; the 40 soldiers who were there to supposedly protect the agents, managed to flee while shooting in the air and abandoning the civilians and their equipment. At the time of the attack, all civilians trying to escape were shot. Those left behind were made prisoners by the attackers for one day. They were freed afterwards and authorised to return towards Bukavu. (Local source 19/09/00, used again in Recinfo n°10 2000).
Since General Lwetcha, who was in the Mayi-Mayi area, joined Kinshasa in 1999 to become chief of staff there, under LD Kabila, even the MM of the northern part of the province no longer received any weapons or support from Kinshasa. It was the same for the Interahamwe.
2.1.2. According to recent sources close to the MM in South Kivu, Hutu armed groups still living in the forests of South Kivu belong to three clearly distinct categories:
a) Between 1500 and 2000 men (of whom certain ex-FAR and Interahamwe, but not all) who can be mobilised for action, have links with the Rwandan Liberation Army (ALIR), a Hutu rebel group composed especially of intellectuals who, from time to time, give a press release. They are still fairly organised politically and, thanks to ex-FAR, are relatively disciplined. Their families have been progressively returning to Rwanda. The intellectuals among them speak of democracy, human rights and cohabitation in Rwanda. At present, they could not represent a threat for Rwanda. A few hundred Hutu live in the popular suburbs of Kadutu in Bukavu. But, as long as the cause of conquest or power sharing exists in Rwanda, these people can be mobilised, just as others will be after them. In the case where, in addition, they would be supported by Congo, and would have at their disposal military and logistic possibilities for going into action from the Congolese territory, they could one day constitute a force. This is not the case at all today. These people are easily spotted, and since their situation in Congo is not excellent, they would be ready to put their weapons down if they were guarantied peace in Rwanda or the status of ordinary refugees in DRC, or another African country - while waiting for a real reconciliation and democratisation in Rwanda. Certain Hutu leaders exiled in Europe, and who exercise a moral authority on them, and whom they trust, could serve as intermediaries for negotiations with West-African countries prepared to welcome them. ALIR members had short contacts with the MM; but collaboration has become increasingly weaker during this past year, the ones and the others understanding that their objectives were different. Hutu armed groups have become distrustful towards the MM and certain groups could hand them over. Any attempt in this direction could be a cause for carnage by the APR, against persons who cannot defend themselves, while armed Hutu would be able to disappear in the forests.
These armed Hutu are apparently not in a systematic relation with the Burundian rebels. Who is supplying them with weapons? They were able to benefit, for a time, from large quantities of weapons and ammunitions coming from their former caches in Rwanda and Kivu between 1994 and 1996. One could not overrule the fact that, over the years, they received air deliveries coming from East Africa. Nothing points to Kinshasa helping them seriously because the MM would have known about it.
b) The Interahamwe who are organised in militias wandering here and there, without any co-ordination. They are bands of criminals who do not want to fall under the authority of ALIR and who pillage, steal, rape and kill local populations. They are also trying to survive. ALIR and the MM are looking for these bands. They apparently have no plans to go back to Rwanda because they practice plundering even near borders. The APR is not doing its best to fight them, even when local populations inform them of the exact location of these militias. It even happens that the commanding officer admits to not being there for that purpose. Because of their lack of organisation and the fact that they are irredeemable, these bands cannot represent a threat to Rwanda.
c) For one year at least, numerous different but corroborating sources from South Kivu have been reporting the new worrying and devastating phenomenon of "false Interahamwe", Hutu operating under the orders or at least as open accomplices of APR Tutsi militaries who are themselves in direct contact with Kigali. (cf. all the details in this regard in the joint 10-page document: "Who is responsible for the repeated attacks in the hinterland near Bukavu? Cf. also Recinfo n°9 2000). Some of them have been caught by the APR in Kivu, brought to Rwanda for a recycling, and then sent back to Kivu with Hutu released from Rwandan prisons. Some are directly in contact with APR officers who cover their actions. The goods they steal end up in Rwanda via APR officers.
At the beginning of September 2000, Colette Braeckman summarised the situation in the following manner: "Interahamwe militia groups remain a justification for war, given the threat they would represent to Rwanda. In reality, it is the civilian population who is victim of an increasing insecurity: in the space of one year, we counted 28 attacks against parishes, health centres, agricultural research institutes and religious congregations. Interrogated on the subject, the Governor who gave us an exhaustive list of all the attacks, invariably refers to the Interahamwe who, according to him, are potentially still present in the forests of the region, despite the massive presence of the Rwandan army that has been all powerful since 1996. In reality, other sources, whether religious or civilian, Congolese or expatriated, and direct witnesses coming from peasant areas, have described a rather different situation: it appears that the hinterland of Bukavu, which is very densely populated and where one finds many parishes and a multitude of development projects, is systematically attacked, provoking the exodus of the population towards the bush or popular suburbs in town. This relative depopulation of the rural areas results in or aims at depriving the MM resistance groups of their bases of popular support. In Kivu where the situation is boiling, where people are increasingly recalcitrant towards the presence of the Rwandan army, and where most of the citizens favour the MM, a real anti-insurrectional strategy is being implemented: development places, and therefore of potential resistance, are systematically attacked, the rape of women (including by sero-positive militaries) is practised on a scale too large for it to represent isolated incidents, and the population is terrorised by repetitive massacres.
Our interlocutors are confirming today what was only a suspicion last April: it appears that Hutu coming from Rwanda and released from Rwandan prisons, or Interahamwe groups who came back, are today being pushed by the Rwandan army to attack parishes in South Kivu. Our witnesses ensure us that these are false Interahamwe. Contrarily to the 1994 militias, they appear well nourished, some wear black boots, and they are often accompanied by Tutsi carrying Motorola communication devices who seem to direct the operations. While, before, Hutu refugees and militias, chased from the camps and wandering about the forest, were attacking villagers to get hold of food or medicines and take blankets and pots with them, these attackers aim at other things: they take medical equipment, electrical appliances, audio-visual equipment that could not be used in the forest but that could certainly be sold on town markets.
Our witnesses who note that all these attackers speak Kinyarwanda, have also observed that most attacks take place near military camps and that, when the militaries are called for help, they never come. DRC and the Rwandan commandment in Kivu have never commissioned an official inquiry in this regard. Whence the suspicion, if not certitude, that Rwandan militaries would be introducing false Interahamwe in South Kivu, in order to terrorise the population and force it to flee, in order to use these attacks to justify the durability of Rwandan presence in Kivu." (c. Braekman, Le Soir, 08/09/00).
During the following months, these attacks continued in Mbobero (local source 07/11/00), and in Nyantende 6km away from Bukavu, on the 16th and 17th of November. Attacks, killings, rapes and pillages are increasing in the villages around Bukavu, in the chieftainships of Walungu and Kabare. Cases are recorded every day within Ciherano, Kamisimbi, Bugobe, Lurhala, Nyantende and Nyangeni groups. During the week of the 3rd to the 10th of December, 6 attacks were committed: in Nyangezi, 21 peasants were killed, 9 women raped and 3 villages were pillaged; in Kamisimbi, there were 3 attacks, 5 peasants burnt alive in their hut, 29 persons killed, 7 women raped of whom 3 girls aged 6 to 9 years old; in Bugobe, 1 attack with pillaging and 5 persons killed.
The authors of these attacks are the Interahamwe, real and false ones - young Hutu bands formed in the Local Defence centres of DRC-APR, in Kabare and Walungu villages. After forming, these bands disappear since they could not stay in villages, due to the fact that they are foreigners. They are in contact (checked) with Tutsi Rwandan officers.
DRC-APR soldiers know very well where these criminal bands are to be found. In several villages (Ciherano, Kamisimbi and Bugobe), peasants no longer sleep in their huts. From 18:00, they go to other villages or in the bush where they spend the night. (Local sources mentioned in Recinfo n°1 2001, from 12/01/01).
On the 24/01, Joseph Mudumbi, DRC-Goma's Chief of Foreign Relations Division, during a press conference in Bukavu, implicitly recognised that the DRC and Rwanda were responsible for these attacks. Answering the question of a journalist asking him to explain why DRC refused to fight the increasing number of attacks against Catholic parishes (more than 50 have already been recorded), against the villages of the Commune of Ngweshe (Mushinga, Mulamba, Burhale, Ciherano, Kamisimbi, Izege and Kaniola), and that are the cause of hundreds of rape cases, pillages, village destruction and population displacement, Mr Joseph Mudumbi said: "It is because the people of Ngweshe contribute towards the Mayi-Mayi that there is this insecurity and these attacks in their commune. This situation will last as long as they do not stop helping the Mayi-Mayi." (Local source 25/01/01, mentioned in Recinfo n°2 2001, from the 12/02/01).
Since then, the killings, rapes and thefts have been continuing: on the 16/02/01, 3 cattle farmers have been shot dead and their cows taken away by factions of APR soldiers in the Mulume Munene mountains, 40km away from Bukavu. The chief of the village grouping of Irongo was tortured by these false Interahamwe who were let loose in Bushi. They placed a padlock on his mouth, thus closing both lips, and left. The chief of this village grouping had just replaced his father who, a month before, had been killed by Rwandan soldiers. Regular APR soldiers provide these bands of false Interahamwe with ammunitions. There is enough evidence to prove it. More than once, confrontations were simulated (in Kaziba and Mwenga) during which APR hid ammunitions and weapons in specific spots to the intention of Interahamwe who could then take them. (Local source 17/02/01, used again in Recinfo n°2 2001, of the 12/02/01).
Kigali keeps on repeating the same arguments: the Rwandan forces will remain in DRC, stated M. Kagame in his New Year message, "in a foreseeable future", because "their mission is not finished" due to the continuous presence, in DRC, of Interahamwe Hutu extremist militias and ex-FAR who constitute "a threat to the security of Rwanda". Yet, the chief of staff of the APR, M. Nyamwasa, indicates that the presence of the APR in DRC resulted in an "enormous" increase in the security of Rwanda and that for the past six months, Interahamwe militias and ex-FAR members gave themselves up as prisoners to the APR, "after having lost the support of the local population in Kivu, and particularly that of Rwandan inhabitants". (Recinfo n°1 2001, of the 12/01/01).
However, since the new Congolese president was given a kind welcome, and since there is a more critical attitude of the West as regards the security-related argument forwarded by Rwanda to justify its continuous presence in DRC, Rwanda has itself begun to put in perspective and minimise the so-called "threat" that the Interahamwe and ex-FAR would still represent for Rwanda. In addition to reducing their numbers from 40 000 to 15 000, Kagame is no longer insisting on the fact that all these militias must be judged. Only their leaders should be arrested and transferred in Arusha. Many others can be reintegrated in Rwandan society via 'gacaca' institutions or can be made to settle in West Africa. According to Rwandan officials interviewed by the ICG in February 2001 in New York, "if the international community supplies a financial support, the Interahamwe problem can be resolved rapidly, if Kinshasa stops supporting them." (cf. IGC Africa Report n°27 of the 16/03/01: From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in the Congo, p.10).
Nevertheless, until today, these security-related arguments continue being repeated by Kigali, to justify its refusal to withdraw the Rwandan troops. But the UN report on the illegal exploitation of wealth in East Congo has clearly shown that, today, refusal to leave is particularly due to Mafia-like circles around Kagame, no longer ready to abandon this manna allowing them to live in conditions that poor rural Rwandans cannot offer them.
2.2 Hutu in the Congolese governmental army (FAC)
Rwanda is accusing the Congolese government and Zimbabwe of having integrated a considerable number of ex-FAR and Interahamwe units into the governmental FAC. Thus, during the fights of Pweto, in December 2000, and the defections of the FAC and Zimbabwean militaries, Rwanda has accused Zambia of having let go, without disarming them, "some 4 000 Interahamwe" who had taken refuge on its territory, after a personal intervention of LD Kabila to the Zambian president. (ANB-BIA, from diverse sources, 15th of February 2001). Mrs Carla del ponte, of TIPR, criticised Zambia for it.
It is certain that Hutu fought with the FAC after having been trained by the Zimbabwean army. They could have been a few thousands, but not dozens of thousands: from where would they have come without being seen? And they would have created more damage at the side of the FAC and the Zimbabwean army, damage that could not have gone unnoticed. In addition, apparently none were made prisoners of war. They come from these groups who scattered while running away across Congolese forests towards the West and South, when they were faced with the advance of Rwandan and Ugandan troops ('with Kabila') in 1996-1997. They were accompanying the dozens of thousands of fleeing Hutu. Some victims testified that certain ex-FAR groups were trying to organise the protection of small fleeing groups with which they came into contact (cf. Béatrice Umutezi in his book "Mourir au Zaire"). With women, men and children surviving, they arrived in Equator scattered, where many were killed in Mbandaka; some were able to cross towards Congo-Brazaville and RCA, or were able to reach Kinshasa. Others arrived in different areas of Kasai and, others still, in the north of Angola. Indeed, until August 2000, when Rwandans and Ugandans were controlling the Congolese army and its safety completely, many Hutu sought to leave DRC.
Kigali's figure of 4 000, as mentioned above, corresponds to a total of 4 000 Rwandan refugees that the HCR had recorded in camps in Congo-Brazzaville, in RCA and Angola in 1998. A certain number of them had left these camps as from August 1998, probably to join Kinshasa and the FAC on Kabila's call. On the other hand, we have heard Kasaian NGO organisers testifying, in 1998, that some thousands of former Hutu refugees (unarmed) were living in villages in Kasai where they spoke Tshiluba, and had received land plots for cultivation from the chiefs. They were well integrated. Then, in August 1998, civil servants from the State came to recruit Congolese men, but also came to recruit from among the Hutu, the young recruits not necessarily being ex-FAR or Interahamwe. They received military training in Kamina and other places. Other testimonials were given on armed Hutu integrated into the FAC in Mbuji Mayi (including as bodyguards for certain Congolese officers), and in Katanga. They have never constituted separate units, because Kabila was too suspicious. As a result, they enjoyed no autonomy whatsoever. In Lubumbahsi, until recently, we could see ex-FAR officers with their Congolese colleagues while rank soldiers were on the front.
Some diplomatic circles in Kinshasa estimate the total number of Hutu within the FAC to be between 1 500 and a few thousands. These Hutu were sent to the front, with the FAC, for example in Equator (where the MLC said it fought against them), but particularly in Katanga where certain ex-FAR colonels would have been identified near Pweto. In so far as the number of Hutu within the rank of the APR have been increasing constantly, Hutu on both sides might be less inclined to put up a real fight.
It is not certain that they are (still) motivated by genocide as Kigali pretends. Moreover, recent information refers to certain movements of several thousands of these Hutu soldiers allied with the Congolese government, in direction of Kivu and Rwanda. With the death of LD Kabila, they no longer have an interlocutor on the Congolese side, no longer receive support nor subsistence from the Congolese government and prefer to go back to Rwanda, via Kivu, since their material situation in DRC is not very comfortable.
Since the arrival in power of Joseph Kabila, the Congolese government has offered its collaboration, on several occasions, in order to solve the security problem in Rwanda and Uganda, in exchange for the withdrawal of their troops from DRC. Thus, within the framework of an invitation to a conference on Human Rights, Joseph Kabila promised to invite the international community to verify whether there are still Hutu extremists in DRC, and whether these are incorporated in the FAC (Cnpd 13/03/01). In a letter dated 26/02/01 addressed to the Security Council, the Congolese government recognised the security-related preoccupations of Rwanda and the need for resolving the Interahamwe/ex-FAR problem (cf. IGC p.10). The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Léonard She Okitundu, recommended that a summit conference be organised. He recommended that it be dedicated only to the problems of security in Rwanda and Uganda in order to find a solution, together with the international community, to this problem of insecurity that, according to Kigali and Kampala, justifies their presence in DRC. (APA 10/02/01). Rwanda did not react to the offer of the Congolese government that, itself, has continued to deny - against all evidence - the presence of the Hutu in the governmental army.
2.3 Mayi-Mayi (not used again in the list of 'negative forces' in the Lusaka Agreement)
In July 1999, a mission of European NGO representatives remarked on pages 2 and 3 of their report about the Mayi-Mayi - and this seems to still be applicable today: "The Mayi-Mayi (MM) are generally well considered by the populations as "Freedom fighter", as a liberation movement, as the sole protection for people without defence in the face of the Rwandan militaries. This is a very largely and openly expressed judgement, from popular to intellectual circles. It contrasts strongly with the judgement that, two years ago, qualified the MM as undisciplined military bands, perceivably with supernatural powers. In South Kivu, the MM were joined by city dwellers (to the point where tensions exist between traditional MM, used to pillage and brutalise populations, and the new comers who come from Bukavu with a certain ideal), as well as women, ex-FAZ and ex-FAC officers. The movement seems to be structuring itself even more, with the creation of a military and political wing in constant contact. They have infiltrated towns, benefiting from the kindness of a large part of the population. In this regard, people would say: The Mayi-Mayi? To see them, just look in the streets! Or: We are the Mayi-Mayi."
Contrarily to Hutu armed groups, the MM are generally considered as being part of the population and fighting for 'freedom'. One must therefore make a clear distinction between the MM and the Rwandan Hutu armed groups, some of which terrorise local populations. There are in fact an increase in the number of skirmishes between the MM and these armed groups.
Since 2000, the strike force of the MM seems to have diminished, as a result of the constantly increasing pressure of the APR-DRC, as a result of a lack of weapons and other means such as medicines, and as a result of the war being prolonged. Frequent and deadly APR-DRC reprisals have also disintegrated the support from rural populations, as well as certain abuses by certain undisciplined non-controlled groups.
As to the Interahamwe and the ex-FAR, one also needs to distinguish the reality of the Mayi-Mayi according to the different areas in which they are settled. Even if there are contacts between the various groups and areas, there is no real co-ordination between them, and one can hardly speak of a unique movement.
In Maniema, Mayi-Mayi scattered groups had never really been structured nor disciplined. The first months after the launch of the second war in 1998, they were able to control large areas of the province, including several small airports near South Kivu. Little by little, however, DRC-APR troops covered all the centres. No active troops important enough are left today to worry their opponents.
But large groups of people mobilisable do exist, including in North Katanga, called MM, as was shown recently with the case of 1 500 men who came from the territory of Kabongo towards the territory of Malemba-Nkulu. They came under the leadership of a certain General Maccabees, and fought against the FAC by pillaging and destroying houses and property, leading from 150 000 to 200 000 people to run away in the forests. Among the causes of this deadly conflict, it is possible that insecurity was created by FAC troops who came from the defection of Manono in May 1999, who had not been paid for several months and who were forced to survive by depending on civilian populations. This in turn led to the creation of the FAP/Mayi-Mayi, who, unfortunately, were not supervised and were undisciplined. (Local source 02/04/01), mentioned in Recinfo n°5 2001, p.6).
In the territories of Lubero-Beni-Butembo in North Kivu, at present under Ugandan control, and where there is an important presence of Hutu militias, the Mayi-Mayi (called Ngilima at the time of their changing alliances with the AFDL, and in majority Nande), were joined by former FAZ and FAC soldiers. They fought against Ugandan troops, including in the town and airport of Butembo, in Beni and Lubero, during the second half of 2000 and the beginning of 2001. Thus, on the 24/01/01, around fifty persons, of whom an important number of civilians, were killed during an attack launched by the Mayi-Mayi against the Ugandan troops between Beni and Butembo, in Maboya. Most of the inhabitants fled town. On the same day, other groups of Mayi-Mayi attacked for two hours the Ugandan contingent at the airport of Rughenda in Butembo, resulting in the death of 20 Mayi-Mayi and an unknown number of men on the Ugandan side. (Misna, 26/01 - 1/02/01).
However, certain Nande groups let themselves be used by the deputy of Wamba of DRC-ML, Mbusa Nyamwisi, in fighting against Wamba.
At the end of March 2001, some of these groups supposedly joined the FLC of Bemba (unification of Bemba's MLC and DRC-ML). The National Resistance Party, based in Nairobi, began questioning immediately the validity of the agreement signed between the FLC and the Mayi-Mayi, by declaring that Jean-Pierre Bamba would have "manipulated and sold" customary chiefs with whom he signed this peace agreement on behalf of the Mayi-Mayi. (APA 28/03/01). But when the troops of Bemba tried to get hold of a stock of 4 tons of coltan on behalf of a Ugandan officer, the MM resumed their fights. Recently, they have taken hostage about 20 Thai nationals and one Swede.
In the area of Beni-Lubero, they are around 5 000, subdivided into ten sub-groups or so, without a commanding unit, despite certain attempts. They have at their disposal spears, stones, sticks and a few weapons picked up during confrontations with the army. They are groups with no supervision who know many material difficulties. Scattered, they have no common war strategy. Despite the facility in crossing borders, they do not organise ambushes nor cross-border attacks in Uganda or Rwanda. In the most Southern part of the province, under Rwandan control, the Mayi-Mayi seem less active, except around Walikale and towards the border of South Kivu, where they are sometimes mentioned together with the Interahamwe.
The Mayi-Mayi harass the Rwandan, Burundian and DRC troops mostly in South Kivu - where reprisals by the latter are also most frequent and deadly (cf. Makabola, Kasika and Mwenga). Especially in the Southern part, in the areas of Uvira and Fizi, the Forces d'Autodéfense populaire (FAP) - the Mayi-Mayi, with one of their political branches, the Parti de Résistance Nationale (PRN) - say that they work there for the country's sovereignty and integrity against occupants. On this matter, they do agree and form a partnership with the Kinshasa government. The latter has in this regard made a few material offerings towards the Mayi-Mayi, although insignificant in consideration of the objective of chasing foreign troops, especially on the side of Bembe in the South of the province where the commandants Dunia, Kayumba, Nguvu, Zofi and Lweso are active. They say that they represent the Kinshasa government in the liberated territories and that the work they do there in on its behalf. Once the occupants gone, the MM and PRN want to work together with all Congolese for democracy, a constitutional State, and good governance in DRC (Local source 16/03/01).
However, where populations suffer the most from the savage reprisals of the DRC-APR, they sometimes also react against the MM by asking them to leave and to do everything to stop the violence. But it is also in "places where war massacres and crimes have been committed (e.g. Kasika and Makabola) that the greatest number of MM rise. In general, they do not exercise violence towards civilian populations - of whom they are the children. When abuses are committed, these are severely punished or imputed to armed bandits, armed Hutu groups or even to militaries passing for MM. De facto, the MM live from what the already impoverished peasant populations give them. They also receive a few means from Bukavu sympathisers (medicines, communication equipment, money), and a few weapons from Kabila that are carried away through the forest from small flying plains in the areas of Maniema and South Kivu, not controlled by the DRC. The few weapons they have seem somehow to come mainly from catching DRC militaries and from Congolese military defections." (cf. the 14 page report of mission in South and North Kivu, 17th of May to 2nd of June 1999, 12/07/01).
This modest and irregular support from the Kinshasa government came mostly in the Southern part of the province via a few airports held by FAP-MM soldiers - including Kilembwe on the highlands of Itombwe. The DRC had stated at the beginning of March that Kilembwe had been taken by the FDD (AFP 03/03/01). These were the areas of Uvira and Fizi up to North Katanga where the Bembe have cohabited with the Banyamulenge on the highlands; a bit more South is the maquis of Kabila from the 1960s and 1970s. In December 2000, Belgian journalist Raf Custers saw a little carrier coming from Mbuji-Mayi arriving in Kilembwe. Since Joseph Kabila came to power, this support seems to have completely stopped. This is also the area where Banyamulenge militias are in conflict with the MM. These militias have, on several occasions and during these last years, opposed APR-DRC troops.
More North, towards Ngweshe, Bunyakiri and Shabunda, MM groups do not seem to have received concrete support from Kinshasa; and Commandant Padiri who has on several occasions been invited to Kinshasa during the past two years, has always refused the invitations. At the end of February 2001, the Zimbabwean General Amoth Chingome, commandant of the Angolan, Zimbabwean and Namibian forces in DRC, denied any recent support of the loyalist troops to the Mayi-Mayi in the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Maniema. The DRC had accused the loyalist forces of having parachuted weapons and money to the Mayi-Mayi since the last efforts to revive the peace process. (APA 27/02/01).
Under the pressure of the APR-DRC, and because of a lack of means, the MM have had to evacuate, these last months, from the mountainous areas of Bushi in the surroundings of Bukavu. They have had to retreat in the forests more to the West, in direction of Bunyakiri, Shabunda and Mwenga.
MM fighters of South Kivu represent several thousands. But everywhere they cruelly lack food, medicines and weapons (they only possess individual weapons in insufficient numbers and lack "support weapons"), and even clothing. In many other cases, they lack political analysis and societal objective, even if the motivation of chasing the aggressor is indeed present in all of them.
The MM are occupying large 'liberated' areas, especially in the South of the province, where they control, in the Fizi area, a territory as vast as half the size of Belgium, from where they regularly harass Rwandan and Burundian troops. They also operate in the areas of Mwenga and Shabunda. In these liberated areas, they take care of a minimum of organisation, i.e. administration, law and order, schools and community clinics. The DRC-APR is indeed especially interested in the mining areas where they can find coltan, tinstone, gold and diamonds. Skirmishes are occurring particularly in these places, as is shown by the continuous fights around Shabunda, Kamituga and Mwenga.
2.4 Burundian FDD (Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie) of Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye
The FDD are still very much present along Lake Tanganyka, where Burundian militaries are also found. Their leader, Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye supports the Congolese governmental side (and met at the beginning of 2001 President Buyoya in Libreville, on the initiative of Presidents Bongo and J. Kabila). They have been stocked up and supported from governmental areas. Because it is not certain whether Joseph Kabila is going to maintain his father's policy of supporting them, they have been undertaking an increasing number of incursions in Burundi these last months.
The FDD (in contact or not with the FNL, although the latter seems to be itself more present in Burundi) appear in any case as the best performing armed group in this part of the country (apart from Rwandan and Burundian troops). They represent, for the Burundian government, a more important 'threat' than the Interahamwe and ex-FAR could ever represent for the Rwandan government. Local testimonies report that an FDD group of about 600 men is in the highlands of Fizi, towards Mwayenga. More than the MM received, this group has received ammunitions, weapons and financial means from the regime of LD Kabila. LD Kabila did not really trust the MM. As the Burundian troops have left the centres of Kazimia, central Fizi, Baraka and Kabimba along Lake Tanganyka, negotiations between MM and FDD are supposedly taking place concerning the departure of the FDD from the territory, because they also commit pillages, rapes and killings.
Indeed, at the end of 2000, beginning of 2001, the FDD were responsible for many ambushes against Rwandan and Burundian troops (as well as DRC troops), in the plain of Ruzizi around Uvira, and more South towards Baraka and beyond, from the peninsula of Ubwari (on Lake Tanganyka through which they can reach Burundi). These ambushes resulted in many people being killed: "We have witnessed for the past two weeks or so, the general re-activation of all centres of negative forces, in particular in the plain of Ruzizi, in the Midlands and Highlands". On the 20/02, on two occasions, on the road to Luberizi; on the 20/02 in Katana; one FDD attack in Luberizi during the night of the 20th; on the 21/02 towards Mboko, South of Uvira. "The frenquency of ambushes has become quasi-permanent", expressed DRC spokesperson M. Kisanga." (APA 25/02/01).
Contrarily to the Interahamwe/ex-FAR, the FDD are considered by the Burundian government and by the international community as valid and important negotiators who should be brought to join the peace process in Burundi. As for the MM, it is difficult to treat them as simple 'negative forces' that should be disarmed.
Finally, let us recall that the most deadly violence in this part of South Kivu is caused by the Burundian, Rwandan and Banyamulenge militaries. To give an example of this, during the night of the 8-9/10/00, Rwandan and Banyamulenge militaries burned 84 houses in Kiliba / Sucki (4 persons were burnt alive). On the 8/10, a vehicle coming back from the Runingu market was attacked with light weapons by Banyamulenge militaries (5 persons were seriously injured, 6 died including one DRC military). All this is done under the pretence of annihilating the Interahamwe and FDD. They burn houses, rape women and young girls, devastate everything on their way and use these populations as human shields during confrontations with FAP elements. The survivors from the Midlands and from the rural areas are thus forced, left with nothing, to exile towards the central parts where they have no welcoming facilities. (Local sources 07/11/00), used again in Recinfo n°11 2000 of the 30/11/00).
2.5 AFD (Allied Democratic Forces - in which the NALU was integrated in 1996) - Uganda
A certain number of AFD-NALU rebels remain present on both sides of the Ruwenzori and are a cause of insecurity for the Congolese populations of the area of Beni-Butembo, and this is so despite the presence of Ugandan troops.
Moreover, in a speech at the general headquarters of Bombo, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the National Resistance Army (now the UPDF), and in front of South African, French, British, Tanzanian, Kenyan, Rwandan and Ethiopian representatives, President Museveni declared at the beginning of February 2001, regarding Congo: "We have resolved our security problem. I am now in a fairly comfortable position to tell those who slander us concerning Congo that they can go to hell. I am pleased that the new Congolese leader seems to want peace. I wish Congo was stable and had an elected government so that we could withdraw. Some of our regional objectives to go to Congo were reached. We are prepared to help solving the other remaining problems but our external partners should stop slandering us. In Europe, they say that we are in Congo to look for gold. But we have gold here, iron, phosphate, although we are not able to extract them. There is oil in Semliki (river bordering with DRC). Congo does not have gold.(Sic)" This did not prevent President Museveni, directly after his re-election in mid-March, from finding a new reason for not withdrawing his troops from DRC, namely 'the lack of stability' in DRC.
3. Potential Solutions
Recent European and African history has sufficiently shown that military means very rarely solve societal tensions, and certainly not in a sustainable manner. All attempts to solve political problems with military means should therefore be discouraged while negotiations stimulated. Whence the importance of 'national dialogue' mechanisms in these various countries.
After the request of the Security Council of February 2001, addressed to the belligerent signatories of the Lusaka Agreement, to finalise a programme of "Demobilisation, Demilitarisation, Reintegration and Repatriation" (DDRR) by the 15/05/01, the latter seemed desirous of purely and simply entrusting this task to the UN, knowing well enough that the MONUC will probably never have the mandate nor the means to pretend being able to execute this task, and clearing their own essential responsibility.
The European Union, via the Council of Ministers of the 14-15/05/01, showed a more realistic attitude by emphasising the necessity of a voluntary disarmament, reintegration and repatriation if it is to be effective.
It will therefore be necessary to stimulate, or even force, the main protagonists to reach a compromise in order to negotiate solutions, and international actors to keep a clear-head so as to uncover potential obstructive excuses used by one or the other.
3.1 Two primordial objectives should imperatively be sought after and pushed by the 'international community' as preconditions for any solution to suppress 'negative forces' and sustain peace in DRC:
· To begin with, the significant and visible withdrawal of at least a major part of the occupying troops, including withdrawal from concentration areas where diverse armed groups are found, as in Kivu. This would facilitate other steps such as the demobilisation in one way or another of the 'negative forces', and the commitment of the Congolese government in not/no longer accepting to give these armed groups any form of support. Also, as a confidence building measure resulting in the continuity of the withdrawal of Rwandan, Burundian and Ugandan troops, the Congolese government could take the initiative of playing openly as regards its support to the Rwandan and Burundian rebels and undertake to stop such a support. In the same way, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi should be put under pressure in turn to stop any support to their Congolese DRC and FLC rebels. In addition, this would considerably increase chances for Congolese dialogue resulting in something concrete.
· Secondly, the rapid restoration of the Congolese State authority over the 'liberated' areas with the withdrawal of foreign troops, independently of the inter-Congolese dialogue. This task should not be insurmountable since populations are fed up with war and are ready to support any attempt at building a constitutional State. An indication of this is found with, firstly, the populations taking the responsibility of a schooling system for more than a decade, without much intervention from the State. And secondly the success of the cease-fire between Hema and Lendu in the North-east, following the very own procedures of the Congolese, in Bembe. Indeed, only the Congolese State can ensure a long-lasting security on the borders, provided that neighbouring countries do their part as well. Even if they are imperfect at first, the police and the army, if remunerated, can constitute an important factor of stability, as can be seen with the government presently controlling part of the territory, as was also the case during the first half of 1998, including in Kivu. In waiting for the results of the Congolese inter-dialogue, UN forces could temporarily exercise authority by relying on the support of local administration. This is difficult to accomplish over a long time period and on the whole territory the way it is occupied at present. Should it therefore also be planned concomitantly that part of the Congolese State authority be restored more rapidly, in case these dialogues last indefinitely and fail?
Next to these general measures, one must distinguish appropriate complementary measures for the different and particular situations.
3.2 Among the 'negative forces' listed in the Lusaka Agreement as forces to be disarmed, ADF and NALU Ugandan rebels do not therefore represent, or no longer represent a threat for Uganda, nor a reason for prolonging the presence of Ugandan troops in DRC, according to President Museveni himself. Uganda should be encouraged to negotiate with the Congolese government concerning the best way to make the borders between both countries secure, and to increase democratic functioning in the country (a deficit was shown during the last elections). It should also be encouraged to begin negotiations with those rebellions that have been lasting for decades, even if they have committed atrocities.
3.3 FDD Burundian rebels: Via separate negotiations between the Congolese and Burundian government and the rebels, the Congolese government should stop supporting the rebels in exchange for Burundian troops withdrawing from DRC and FDD entering the Burundian negotiations within Arusha.
3.4 As to the Interahamwe and ex-FAR, the following mechanisms could be implemented simultaneously (this is also valid for the other armed groups):
· Requesting the Rwandan government to stop classifying all Rwandan Hutu, who are still in DRC, as genocidal who should be annihilated;
· Explaining the Rwandan government that only a basic democratisation of Rwandan society and sharing real power between Tutsi and Hutu communities can procure sustainable security to Rwandan populations. Any exclusion policy creates, in the long term, new rebellions. Even if all Hutu had left DRC, there are dozens of thousands of young Hutu (and an increasing number of Tutsi also) who can be mobilised not only in Rwanda, but also in Tanzania, Burundi, Uganda and Kenya. The sincere opening of political space allowing citizens to organise themselves, including within the Hutu community who is the largest (cf. aspirations for organisation such as ALIR) would make armed struggle as an alternative policy, less attractive or superfluous.
· Waiting for the restoration of the authority of the Congolese State over the whole territory, it is necessary to reinforce UN presence in Kivu (including in Uvira, Bukavu, Shabunda, Beni, Butembo and Bunia), and increase greatly their mandate so as to include, next to the only protection of equipment of the UN, the protection of observers and populations, co-ordination of the 'disarmament/demobilisation' of remaining armed groups, and the temporary organisation of administration and internal security as well as security on the borders where they could be reinforced by the new Congolese governmental troops. When they are withdrawn from Congo, Rwandan troops (Burundian and Ugandan) could be used in Rwanda itself to reinforce security on the borders and to stop any potential infiltration from Congo. Making the borders secure here and there should also form the object of permanent bilateral negotiations. If these tasks are carried out with the measures mentioned above, they can be taken care of by the MONUC with much less than one tenth of the means used in Kosovo or Bosnia, provided this process is done with international diplomatic confidence and with the following measures:
· Rwanda continuing its welcoming and amnesty policy (provided for in the Lusaka Agreement) towards refugees (whether armed or not), on condition that they give up their weapons. These represent "the huge mass of populations who had nothing to do with the genocide" (Ayello). As in the past, Rwanda should be able to benefit from international aid for this process. Subordinates in charge and who are guilty of the genocide, "those who had a hand in the genocide" (Ayello) and to whom the Rwandan government would not want to give amnesty, could pass through the 'gacaca' system in Rwanda. However, an alternative must be planned for those who do not dare or do not want to go through this system.
· Offering permanent asylum to those Rwandan refugees (whether belonging to a militia or not) who do not want to return to Rwanda, with a few limited means to settle definitely in DRC, at a good distance from the border, as others have done before them (Kasai, Equator), or in other (West) African countries. Here again, international aid could favour the process via certain logistic means and material incentives. On seeing that these people are very suspicious because of their experience over the past years, countries like France and Belgium could take the initiative to negotiate transfers towards a few (West) African countries via certain Hutu leaders exiled in Europe, trusted by refugees in Congo.
· Commitment from the Congolese government (and from Zimbabwean troops and other allies, for as long as they are present) vis-à-vis the UN, to withdraw armed Hutu from the front and to demobilise them by offering them asylum or their transfer to Rwanda if they wish it, in the same conditions as described above. Also, commitment to arrest potential persons responsible for the genocide (the 'thinking masters of the genocide' cf. Ayello; concrete lists exist) who would still be on the territory they are controlling, and to hand them over to the TIPR. In this regard, international pressures should be exercised on other countries harbouring these persons. In order to favour justice and to put an end to impunity favouring repetitions, the UN should sincerely assess the possibility of extending the mandate and jurisdiction of the TIPR to include crimes against humanity that have been committed in DRC since 1996.
· Only those from Rwandan Hutu armed groups refusing to accept offers of integration, asylum or voluntary repatriation - despite negotiation efforts from UN and/or Congolese authorities - and who continue acting like armed bandits, will have to be neutralised as such by a joint action of the Congolese, UN and MM troops. This is a fortiori applicable to the "thinking masters of the genocide" who are still in Kivu, which is very much unlikely.
· As regards the problem of "false Interahamwe" introduced in the course of last year in Kivu by the Rwandan APR, the responsibility of Rwanda could be established with the UN doing a limited investigation. Also, strong pressures should be exercised on Rwanda to repatriate former prisoners and recovered Interahamwe, or to let them settle somewhere else in DRC, or in a third country. Those disappearing in Kivu should be treated as armed bandits as above-mentioned.
3.5 The Mayi-Mayi (and FAP)
As understood from the above-mentioned information, the Mayi-Mayi are not assimilated to 'negative forces' such as Interahamwe, ex-FAR and other FDD by the Congolese and observers aware of the situation, and should therefore not be treated in the same way.
Apart from a few irreducible bands found in every armed groups of East Congo, the major part of Mayi-Mayi groups - once their objective as regards the withdrawal of foreign troops has been reached - can easily be integrated either in the new national army, or demobilised with a few means and economic perspective still limited at this stage. This supposes, however, that the UN, the occupying countries and the Congolese government treat them as nationalist fighters, representative of an important section of Kivu society (certainly in South Kivu), and that they therefore include the Mayi-Mayi into every national dialogue, at least in the same way as DRC and FLC rebels.
If this does not happen, not only the Mayi-Mayi might not see themselves represented in a new government of national unity, and will thus maintain their armed fight for democracy, but they might also influence the opinion of a large part of the Kivu population. They are at present already strongly against the fact that inter-Congolese dialogue has begun before the occupying troops in the Eastern part of the country have withdrawn, with the risk that the dialogue comes to nothing, thus establishing the partition of the country. Also, at the same time, they can play a role in the pacification of the hinterland, through their contacts and knowledge of the territory, once the Rwandan and Burundian troops have left.
3.6 Banyamulenge militias, DRC and FLC Congolese troops
DRC and FLC Congolese troops will have to be either integrated in the new national army, or be partly demobilised, with a few means of re-insertion. Independent Banyamulenge militias from DRC-APR could possibly integrate the national army in the same way as and without distinction from all the other Congolese ethnic groups. The political and civic rights of the Munyamulenge minority should be guarantied by inter-Congolese dialogue and the new constitution, in the same way as all other Congolese minorities (i.e. each of the more than 400 Congolese ethnic groups in relation to all the others).
Conclusion
A group of Kivu intellectuals recently summed up the situation: "We must let autonomous and free Congolese soldiers - and even DRC troops in Kivu, as well as the MM - manage their territory, we must deploy UN troops on the borders and deploy the Rwandans and Burundians on their borders, at home, and we will no longer hear of Interahamwe and insecurity in less than a year in these countries. The equation is made difficult because of the interaction between Rwandans (APR and ex-FAR, Hutu and Tutsi, real and false Interahamwe and APR). The MM could be very efficient in the demobilisation process of Rwandan and Burundian militias. On the condition that fighting troops first withdraw from Kivu and that the UN be deployed on the eastern borders of Congo." (Local sources, 22/03/01).
The Round Table of Montréal on Human Rights (6 Canadian NGO) also formulated an opinion: "The difficult problem of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe, suspected of having taken part to the Rwandan genocide in 1994, also concerns the international community. For its lack of intervention in the refugee camps from 1994 to 1996, in order to disarm these militias, the international community is partly responsible for the presence of these militias in Congo. Leaving the task of neutralising them to Rwandan and Ugandan officers, as we have done since 1996, did not prevent civilian populations from being massacred. Ultimately, the issue of each rebel force using the neighbouring country should be solved through regional negotiations between sovereign and responsible States. From now until then, the MONUC must be positioned on the borders so as to bring security to the populations, secure the neutralisation of "negative forces" and prevent armed incursions on either side of the borders." (February 2001).
The "Interahamwe and ex-FAR" problem not being the only problem, nor even being the main reason for continued presence of Rwandan troops (and Ugandan troops) in DRC, the international community will have to show clear-headedness and prevent any obstruction from these countries in the reasonable resolution of the 'security problem'.
Brussels, 5th of June 2001
Jules Devos (with the support of the REC Co-ordinating Team)
The following documents are very useful and are available at the REC Secretariat:
- Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria), Rebel Forces Influencing the Security Situation in the Great Lakes (draft) 15pp. 04/06/01. Overview of the different 'negative forces'.
- Who is responsible for the repeated Attacks in the Hinterland near Bukavu? 11p.